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1. Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent and 
determinants of sustainability disclosure practice in 
Nigeria. The second objective is to examine if the 
effectiveness of intellectual capital moderates the 
relationship between board governance mechanisms and 
sustainability disclosure. In the course of carrying out 
this research, content analysis was conducted to extract 
sustainability disclosure information from annual reports 
of 80 companies listed on Nigerian Stock Exchange. The 
study spanned from 2010-2015. Board size, board 
independence, board diversity and board meetings were 
considered as determinants of sustainability disclosure. 
The sustainability disclosure index and board governance 
measures were computed for estimation of the regression 
analysis. The percentages were used to describe the 
nature and extent of sustainability disclosure among the 
sampled companies. A multiple regression analysis was 
used to test the relationships specified in the study. The 
result of the descriptive analysis evidence a low-level 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual reports 
of companies. From the regression analysis, board size, 
board independence and board diversity were found to 
enhance the disclosure of sustainability information. 
However, board meeting was found to be insignificantly 
related to sustainability disclosure. The results also reveal 
that intellectual capital has a significant positive effect on 
the relationship between board size, board independence, 
board diversity and sustainability disclosure. However, 
intellectual capital does not seem to moderate the 
relationship between board meetings and sustainability 
disclosure. The findings from this study have both 
theoretical and practical implications.  
 
Keyword: Board Characteristics, Corporate 
Governance, Sustainability Disclosure, Intellectual 
Capital, Stakeholders.   
1.0 Introduction 
Sustainability reporting is a form of corporate self-
regulation integrated into business models with the 
view to serve both social and environmental 
dimensions of business (Cormier, Ledoux, & 
Magnan, 2011). The main motive for corporate 
sustainability reporting is to legitimize companies’ 
operation and to justify their continued existence 
(Daub, 2007). Companies disclose sustainability 
information to acknowledge societal concerns and 
to maintain positive relationships with key 
stakeholders. In this circumstance, companies need 
to achieve an economic performance that ensures 
adequate return on investment, while considering 
the social and environmental implications of their 
actions. Interestingly, many organizations have 
achieved such functions through matching of social 
performance initiatives with the main corporate 
strategic decisions. This is vital as corporate 
performance will be assessed using both the 
traditional (economic) performance indicators and 
the extent of commitment to sustainability 
performance (Aguilera, Rupp, & Williams, 2007). 
In this way, companies will be able to evaluate the 
effect of their decisions on the shareholders and 
also on other diverse stakeholders, including 
employees, customers, suppliers and the 
community as a whole.  
Sustainability reporting practices have witnessed a 
tremendous increase and its notion broadened 
considerably (Cho, Michelon, Patten, & Roberts, 
2015). This happens, because companies are under 
more public scrutiny worldwide than ever before 
and are pressured to provide information on their 
sustainability practices (Rao, Tilt, & Lester, 2012). 
For this reason, reporting on companies’ 
sustainability activities is increasingly becoming 
vital for businesses to demonstrate their 
commitment to social and environmental issues. 
However, despite the successes recorded in 
sustainability reporting practice, significant 
discrepancies were noticed in practice which relates 
to both the content and the quality of reports among 
companies at various domains across the globe 
(Fortanier, Kolk, & Pinkse, 2011). In Nigeria, 
sustainability reporting is a voluntary exercise with 
no single unified framework that guides its 
implementation. The practice is mostly 
characterized by absent of enforcement and 
inadequate legislation. Similarly, the legal backing 
system suffers from weakness in compliance and 
enforcement, which invariably affect the process of 
sustainability disclosure application (Echefu & 
Akpofure, 2002). The defect in Nigeria’s 
sustainability reporting practice was reported by 
Ademigbuji (2014). Among other things, the study 
reveals that inadequate legislation is the foremost 
problem confronting sustainability practice in 
Nigeria. The reason behind this stems from lack of 
political will and laxity on the part of the 
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authorities to entrench the initiative within the 
Nigerian business environment.  
Another issue identified as a challenge confronting 
sustainability reporting in Nigeria is the lack of 
much appreciation of building businesses that 
creates a sustainable environment. In addition to 
this, most Nigerian indigenous companies view 
sustainability reporting as merely a corporate 
philanthropy or a mechanism for strengthening the 
relationship with host communities. Many see 
sustainability initiatives as a representation of much 
commitment of resources with no quantified 
returns. Others understood the practice as being an 
intensive and time-consuming task that requires 
gathering of information, writing content as well as 
securing internal sign-off at the topmost level of 
organizations (Usidamen, 2014). Therefore, in line 
with the recent trend in sustainability reporting 
across the globe, numerous interested parties are 
becoming more concerned about the magnitude, 
extensiveness and transparency of information 
disclosed. Thus, different constituents are 
demanding for more disclosure of social and 
environmental information. The situation is also the 
same in Nigeria context, various stakeholders are 
demanding for more companies’ sustainability 
report. On the contrary, limited sustainability 
information is disclosed by companies which is not 
sufficient to enable users make meaningful 
decisions. This situation has given rise to an 
expectation gap between various stakeholders 
(Uwalomwa, 2011).  
Based on the evidence mentioned above, the 
present study seeks to explore the extent of 
sustainability disclosure and also the factors that 
determine the disclosure of sustainability 
information in the annual report of Nigerian 
companies. Internal governance factors were 
selected as possible determinants of sustainability 
reporting. Board structure variables, including 
board size, board independence, board diversity 
and board meetings were favored. Board 
governance mechanisms were considered desirable 
because they are internal governance mechanisms 
that ensure close alignment of managers and 
shareholders interest. Therefore, it is expected that 
companies with more effective board structure will 
be particularly diligent in providing information on 
sustainability-related issues.  
Nonetheless, a review of prior studies on board 
characteristics and sustainability disclosure shows 
that most of the studies have highlighted the recent 
contextual developments in corporate governance 
attributes and sustainability disclosure. 
Unfortunately, many of these studies were product 
of western economies (Burgwal & Vieira, 2014; 
Jamali & Mirshak, 2007; Wanderley, Lucian, 
Farache, & De Sousa Filho, 2008) or Asia Pacific 
(Abdullah, Mohamad & Mokhtar, 2011; Chau & 
Gray, 2010; Esa & Mohd-Ghazali, 2012; 
Handajani, Subroto, Sutrisno, & Saraswati, 2014; 
Shamil, Shaikh Ho & Krishnan, 2014). Limited 
studies were undertaken in Sub-Saharan African 
countries Nigeria inclusive. In addition, the few 
available literatures in Nigeria are mostly 
exploratory and survey studies (Ekwueme, 
Egbunike, & Onyali, 2013; Fadun, 2014; Leyira, 
Uwaoma, & Olagunju, 2011; Ngwakwe, 2009; 
Uzonwanne, Yekini, Yekini, & Otobo, 2014) and 
thus contained little or no quantifiable data 
(Innocent, Gloria, & Priscilla, 2014). By this 
prevailing situation, it’s uncertain whether 
corporate governance and sustainability disclosure 
practiced in these countries are applicable in 
Nigeria and other sub-Saharan countries.  
Besides, a review of the studies relating board 
governance attributes and sustainability disclosure 
present equivocal findings, as such, a definite 
conclusion was not reached. On this basis, some 
studies suggested that the inconsistencies may point 
to the possibility that some important moderating 
or intervening variables were overlooked. 
Accordingly, Wahba and Elsayed (2015) suggest 
testing the relationship indirectly by the 
introduction of a mechanism variable through 
which the relationship between board 
characteristics and sustainability disclosure could 
be enhanced. Based on this suggestion, the present 
study introduces intellectual capital as a moderating 
variable in the model. Intellectual capital refers to 
the package of useful knowledge which comprises 
of organizations’ processes, technologies, patents, 
skills and information about customers, suppliers 
and stakeholders (Mushref, 2014).  
Considering the significance of intellectual capital 
to companies’ long-term viability, companies can 
leverage this intangible asset to improve 
sustainability disclosure for diverse users. Efficient 
application of intellectual capital processes could 
serve as a means of creating exceptional 
relationships between companies and their 
stakeholders which is most desirable in fulfilling 
stakeholders’ expectations (Sachs, Post, & Preston, 
2002). Accordingly, the feedbacks companies 
receive from different stakeholders will assist in 
understanding specific needs of their stakeholders. 
In this manner, companies’ management can 
effectively understand the categories of 
sustainability practice best valued by stakeholders. 
Through this avenue, board characteristics 
mechanisms may likely have a positive significant 
influence on sustainability disclosure through 
intellectual capital interaction. This proposition 
remains unexplored in the context of this study and 
the world at large. 
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Therefore, this study extends prior research by 
investigating the relationship between board 
governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure; and determined the influence of 
intellectual capital on the relationship between 
board governance mechanism and sustainability 
disclosure using a data sample of 80 Nigerian listed 
companies. Accordingly, this paper is structured as 
follows: section two contains a review of the prior 
literature, this includes the theories underpinning 
the study, the relationship between board 
characteristics and sustainability disclosure 
followed by hypothesis development. Section three 
discusses the methodology adopted by the study 
and section four presents the discussion of findings. 
Conclusion and recommendations are delineated in 
section four. 
2.1 Literature Review 
2.1.1 Theoretical Underpinning 
The stakeholder theory is a key paradigm for 
explaining the relationship between board 
governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure. The theory is seen as an integral part of 
sustainability reporting literature as it provides a 
better means of relating companies with their 
diverse stakeholders. The theory presumes 
companies as a nexus of contract between 
companies and their stakeholders. Companies have 
an extensive responsibility to different stakeholder 
groups, including suppliers, customers, employees, 
government and the communities. Therefore, 
conflicts between various stakeholders will likely 
have a negative impact on the capacity of 
companies to function effectively (Becker & Potter, 
2002). Accordingly, stakeholder theory contributes 
to such debate by bringing supplementary business 
argument as to why companies must work toward 
achieving sustainable development. Stakeholder 
theory believes that companies should operate in a 
socially responsible manner towards satisfying the 
interest of diverse stakeholders, and the best way to 
achieve this is through sustainability reporting 
initiatives. 
Stakeholder theory is equally fitting into the 
perspective of board governance processes. Board 
members are representative of shareholders whose 
responsibility is to ensure that the interest of all 
stakeholders are justly balanced. They are expected 
to ensure that companies discharge their broader 
responsibility and stakeholder accountability. For 
this reason, an effective board with the interest of 
all stakeholders will be able to convey information 
to entire stakeholder group informing them how 
well-managed their company is and that 
stakeholders interest is prioritized (Michelon & 
Parbonetti, 2010). Hence, board governance 
mechanisms being a key component of corporate 
governance attributes have the potential to enhance 
companies’ sustainability practice. 
Consistent with the theoretical views in prior 
corporate governance-sustainability disclosure 
research, the empirical findings between board 
governance attributes and sustainability disclosure 
present an equivocal results (Amran & Haniffa, 
2011; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2003; Haddock, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Monteiro & Aibar-Guzmán, 2010; Tagesson 
et al., 2009). The mixed results in prior research 
suggest a shift of focus from the usual direct 
relationship to indirect relationship using a 
contextual variable (Wahba & Elsayed, 2015). In 
response to this suggestion, the current study 
introduced intellectual capital as an interactive 
variable in the model. The aim was to observe 
whether the relationship between board governance 
mechanisms and sustainability disclosure can be 
strengthened with the inclusion of intellectual 
capital as a moderating variable.  Accordingly, 
RBV theory was selected as an ideal proposition 
for explaining this relationship. The key tenet of 
the RBV theory is that companies compete on the 
basis of resources and capabilities and these 
resources and capabilities are heterogeneous and 
also differ across companies. Therefore, the 
moment the resources and capabilities are non-
substitutable, inimitable, valuable and rare, a 
company will be able to achieve a sustainable 
competitive advantage (Passetti, Tenucci, Cinquini, 
& Frey, 2009).  
Accordingly, intellectual capital is viewed as 
unique companies’ resources that can be deployed 
to enhance the disclosure of sustainability 
information in annual reports of companies. 
Therefore, companies can efficiently utilize their 
knowledge assets to create a viable relationship 
with various stakeholders through proper 
communication and feedback mechanisms. In this 
way, companies can take advantage of the views 
and opinions of their stakeholders with the aim of 
channeling their sustainability initiatives to suit the 
interest of diverse stakeholders. Through this 
medium, companies can foster a good and cordial 
relationship with their employees, improve their 
brand image and public reputation. Based on this 
view, intellectual capital is likely to play an 
interactive role in the relationship between board 
governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure. Hence, RBV theory is capable of 
explaining this relationship.  
2.1.2 Review of Related Literature and Hypothesis 
Development 
The literature on corporate sustainability disclosure 
demonstrates that there are differences in the level 
of sustainability reporting among companies and 
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that board governance mechanisms  are key 
determinants of corporate sustainability disclosure 
(Al-bassam, Ntim, Opong, & Downs, 2015). 
Sustainability reporting involves discretionary 
allocation of corporate resources toward improving 
social welfare and enhancing relationships with key 
stakeholders. It is a practice that prevails on 
companies to disclose their duties and 
responsibilities to various stakeholders. 
Sustainability reporting enables companies to 
improve their reputation with a broad range of 
stakeholders including suppliers, customers, 
investors, bankers and competitors. It provides the 
opportunity for re-configuring competitive position 
of companies and develops distinctive and dynamic 
resources and capabilities. Companies disclose 
sustainability information for the purpose of 
transparency and to meet the needs of diverse 
stakeholders. Such information is also disclosed to 
narrow the information asymmetry between 
management and their stakeholders (Ho & Taylor, 
2013). Therefore, companies with effective 
sustainability disclosure initiatives promote not 
only ethics, transparency and accountability but 
also corporate performance. Accordingly, 
companies can reap benefits from a successful 
implementation of sustainability initiatives. 
Benefits such as better economic performance, 
improved firm’s reputation, attracting better 
investors and high morale among employees (Ling 
& Sultana, 2015).     
However, sustainability reporting is closely aligned 
with companies’ governance processes. The two 
are mostly considered as complementary 
mechanisms that enhance stakeholder management. 
Corporate sustainability disclosure is also an 
outcome of improved governance structure. An 
effective sustainability disclosure practice is based 
on good standards of corporate governance. 
Corporate governance improves companies’ 
stakeholder relationship by fostering corporate 
sustainability. It improves the social picture of 
companies and reduces uncertainty which often 
leads to achieving efficient alignment of company’s 
financial goals and societal values (Iatridis, 2013). 
Accordingly, a corporate board with attributes of 
good governance structure is more likely to 
demonstrate corporate social and environmental 
responsibility. Particularly, companies with 
desirable board governance structure ensure 
corporate effectiveness and strategic development 
which often lead to better corporate sustainability 
performance. Therefore, considering the 
significance of board governance mechanisms to 
corporate sustainability disclosure, this study 
employed four board governance variables as key 
determinants of sustainability disclosure, this 
includes board size, board independence, board 
diversity and board meetings. The next section 
reviewed the prior literature on the selected board 
governance variables and sustainability disclosure.  
2.1.2.1 Board Size  
The size of corporate board may affect the manner 
in which corporate directors conduct their 
responsibilities (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This 
implies that the number of directors on corporate 
board may influence the ability of the board to 
monitor and assess management practices and 
procedures. This including level of sustainability 
information disclosed by companies. Accordingly, 
several arguments arise in the literature on whether 
the size of corporate boards determines the 
disclosure of companies’ sustainability 
information. This argument always prevails due to 
the strategic posture of board members in 
companies’ policies and strategies. On this basis, 
one stream of research supported a larger board and 
concluded that larger boards have a positive 
influence on companies’ sustainability disclosure.  
Among others, Akhtaruddin, Hossain, Hossain, and 
Yao (2009), Chang, Oh, Jung and Lee (2012), Esa 
& Mohd-Ghazali (2012) provide evidence of a 
positive relationship between board size and 
sustainability. Based on the positive findings, Esa 
& Mohd-Ghazali (2012) argued that larger boards 
offer more knowledge and experience and also put 
forward different ideas in board deliberations. 
Similarly, Haji & Mohd-Ghazali (2013) concluded 
that large board size is connected with increased 
monitoring capacity which could lead to sharing of 
a variety of experiences in boardrooms. Besides, a 
corporate governance-sustainability disclosure 
study conducted on a sample of 50 Pakistan 
companies by Lone, Ali, and Khan (2016) 
established that a large number of directors on 
corporate boards brings the experiences of diverse 
backgrounds which affect the level of sustainability 
reporting in companies. More recently, Sadou, 
Alom, and Laluddin (2017) highlighted that larger 
boards are more effective and have greater 
influence over companies’ sustainability disclosure. 
On the other side, some literature provided 
evidence of a negative association between board 
size and sustainability disclosure. Accordingly, 
Uwuigbe et al. (2011) provide evidence of a 
negative relationship between board size and 
sustainability disclosure in the context of Nigeria. 
Said, Zainuddin and Haron (2009) evidenced a 
significant negative relationship between board size 
and sustainability disclosure, advocating that large 
board size result to ineffectiveness in 
communication coordination and decision-making. 
However, a study conducted on a sample of public 
listed Indonesian companies by Siregar and 
Bachtiar (2010) found a non-linear relationship 
between board size and sustainability disclosure. 
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The study noted that a large board would be able to 
exercise better monitoring, but too large board will 
render the monitoring process ineffective. 
In Nigeria, the rule guiding the size of a corporate 
board is spelled out in the country’s corporate 
governance code. Specifically, the revised code of 
corporate governance 2011 stipulates that corporate 
board size should be relative to the complexity and 
scale of companies’ operations. The code further 
specifies that the number of directors in company’s 
board should not fall below five (5). However, the 
governance code did not specify the maximum 
number of directors a company should appoint for 
any specified period. Therefore, considering the 
provision in Nigeria’s revised corporate 
governance code and in relation to the provision of 
stakeholder theory which supports larger size 
board, this study expects board size to have a 
positive influence on the level of sustainability 
disclosure. Accordingly, the study hypothesized 
that; 
 H1: Board size has a significant positive influence 
on the level of sustainability disclosure. 
2.1.2.2 Board Independence 
Directors on corporate boards have different 
values, interest and time horizons (Post, Rahman, 
& Rubow, 2011). Independent directors, in 
particular, appear to be less attached to economic 
performance and more concerned with company’s 
sustainability initiatives. They are more likely to 
support investments in the long-term sustainability 
of a company even if such investment conflict with 
short-term economic performance goals (Johnson 
& Greening, 1999). This is obvious as independent 
directors may feel attending to sustainability 
reporting issues is in the best interest of all 
stakeholders. However, despite several support for 
independent directors on corporate boards, debates 
were still ongoing whether independent directors 
are able mechanism for aligning managerial 
interests with those of shareholders and also their 
value creation merits on sustainability reporting 
investment.  
A study conducted on a sampled US firms by 
Zhang, Zhu, and Ding (2013) claims that 
independent directors have more diverse 
background and represents external stakeholders of 
companies. As such, they have a stronger 
orientation towards sustainability reporting practice 
than their counterparts in the boardroom. 
Accordingly, Zhang et al. provide empirical 
evidence showing that independent directors have a 
positive influence on companies sustainability 
reporting. Similar findings were reported by Huang 
(2010), Khan (2010), Jo and Harjoto (2012), Sharif 
and Rashid (2014), Kaur, Raman and Singhania 
(2016). These studies indicated a positive link 
between board independence and sustainability 
reporting. Based on a positive result, Huang (2010) 
concluded that independent directors act as a 
monitoring mechanism that ensures companies are 
properly managed by corporate management and 
also work towards enhancing corporate image and 
sustainability.  
Conversely, Michelon and Parbonetti (2010), 
Janggu, Darus, Zain and Sawani (2014) provided 
evidence of an insignificant relationship between 
independent directors and sustainability disclosure. 
This suggests that board independence does not 
seem to play a vital role in improving the level of 
sustainability disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports. Based on the insignificant result observed, 
Abdullah et al. (2011) affirmed that independent 
directors are not effective in discharging their 
duties, talk less of going against other members of 
the boards. Additionally, Al-Moataz and Hussainey 
(2012) reiterated that higher number of independent 
directors on companies’ boards leads to less 
effective board monitoring and equally lower levels 
of corporate transparency.  
From the perspective of stakeholder theory, 
managers are perceived as moral agents other than 
opportunistic individual. As such, their role is to 
achieve a balance between the interest of diverse 
stakeholders (Shankman, 1999). Therefore, it is 
presumed that a corporate board with a higher 
proportion of independent directors will ensure 
improved board monitoring quality and also work 
toward satisfying the needs of all stakeholders. 
Therefore, based on stakeholder theory’s 
declaration and the positive result observed in the 
extant literature, this study anticipates a significant 
positive relationship between board independence 
and sustainability disclosure. This implies that with 
a higher proportion of independent directors on a 
corporate board, a company will exhibit more 
concern and give more attention to sustainability 
disclosures. Accordingly, the following hypothesis 
is formulated for the guidance of the study. 
H2: Board independence has a significant positive 
influence on level of sustainability disclosure       
2.1.2.3 Board Diversity 
A growing body of contemporary research on 
boards and board roles suggested that diversity in 
the boardroom has the potential to increase board 
effectiveness and firm performance (Carter, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). Board diversity in this 
context refers to the presence of women directors 
on corporate boards. Board diversity facilitates in-
depth discussions and alternative perspectives and 
is more likely to be beneficial in the course of 
uncertainties and complex decisions. A board with 
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female members is more able to integrate the 
interest of multiple stakeholders, including 
employees, customers, suppliers and the 
communities with the performance-based interests 
of shareholders (Harrison & Coombs, 2012). 
Recruitment of more women into corporate boards 
is likely to bring about diversity of opinions and 
perspective to board discussion including 
deliberations on sustainability disclosure issues. 
Therefore, a board with greater diversity is likely to 
increase companies’ ability to recognize the need 
and interest of various stakeholder groups, identify 
best strategies that will align the varied interests 
and to manage potential conflict between 
shareholders (Harjoto, Laksmana, & Lee, 2014).  
Based on the different perceptions in prior 
literature, several studies attempted to examine the 
impact of board gender diversity on companies’ 
sustainability disclosure. Back in 2008, Barako and 
Brown conducted a study on Kenyan Banks to 
determine the influence of gender on corporate 
social reporting. The study’s findings reveal that a 
higher representation of women in corporate board 
significantly increases companies’ social 
disclosure. Similarly, Setó-Pamies (2013) argued in 
favor of board diversity that, the presence of 
women in corporate boardrooms improves the 
relationship with stakeholders, increase 
accountability, shows greater concern for the 
environment and prompts more ethical behavior. 
More recently, Rao and Tilt (2015) conducted a 
comprehensive review of prior board diversity and 
sustainability disclosure literature. Most of the 
reviewed studies suggested that diverse boards 
have a significant positive influence on the level of 
sustainability disclosure. Based on the review, Rao 
and Tilt concluded that the impact of having 
females on corporate board is likely to be minimal 
except when there is a critical mass. However, from 
the viewpoint of stakeholder theory, the presence of 
females in corporate boardroom is a signal to 
companies’ stakeholders that, such company is 
socially responsible and also pays more attention to 
the needs of diverse stakeholders (Bear, Rahman, 
& Post, 2010).  
In the context of Nigeria, culture plays a pivotal 
role in restricting women’s participation in 
corporate boards. However, this perception is 
gradually fading out as such the significance of 
gender diversity is nowadays becoming obvious 
and visible (Şener & Karaye, 2014). This was made 
possible following some strong measures put in 
place by key regulatory agencies to mitigate gender 
imbalance in corporate boards. An example is the 
recent measure put in place by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) to boost female representation in 
board formation in the country. The CBN through 
its banker's committee imposes mandatory quota 
target on commercial banks. The aim is to increase 
women’s representation on companies’ boards to 
30 percent (Şener & Karaye, 2014). Therefore, 
considering the recent changes in Nigerian gender 
diversity policies and also the view of stakeholder 
theory which supports a positive association 
between board diversity and sustainability 
disclosure, this study expects board diversity to 
have a positive and significant impact on 
companies’ sustainability disclose. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is postulated: 
H3: Board diversity has a significant positive 
influence on level of sustainability disclosure       
2.1.2.4 Board Meetings  
Board meeting frequency reflects the diligence and 
vigilance of corporate board in conducting their 
monitoring roles. The frequency of board meeting 
is a significant proxy for measuring the 
effectiveness and intensity of board monitoring and 
discipline (Vafeas, 1999). However, there are two 
opposing views on the prospective impact of board 
meeting on corporate non-financial performance. A 
group of scholars contended that frequency of 
board meeting represents board effectiveness and 
also facilitate better supervision of company’s 
operations and motivates increased transparency in 
companies (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). While others 
are of the view that, the frequency of board 
meetings symbolizes inefficacy of directors, which 
limits directors’ performance (Vafeas, 1999). 
However, sustainability reporting is known to be at 
the center of companies’ board meeting, as 
companies integrate social concern in their business 
operations. For this reason, the effect of board 
meetings on corporate sustainability reporting was 
investigated by several studies. However, the 
findings were conflicting.  
Barros, Boubaker, and Hamrouni (2013) found a 
significant positive relationship between the 
frequency of board meetings and sustainability 
disclosure among listed firms in France. A similar 
result was reported by Staden and Chen (2010) 
which shows that frequency of board meetings is a 
symbolic representation of an enhanced 
sustainability reporting disclosure. Jizi, Salama, 
Dixon, and Stratling (2014) reveals a positive 
impact of board meetings on sustainability 
disclosure performance. In contrast, Rodríguez-
Ariza, García-Sánchez, and José-Valeriano (2011) 
provide empirical evidence supporting an 
insignificant relation between board meetings and 
sustainability disclosure. Suggesting that there is no 
need for frequency of board meetings as it seems 
not to have a substantive influence on companies’ 
sustainability practice. A similar study by 
Giannarakis (2014) noticed that board of directors 
are only responsible for companies’ sustainability 
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disclosure at policy level instead of implementation 
level. As such, board meeting will not be able to 
play a critical role in the disclosure of companies’ 
sustainability information. Additionally, Ayoib and 
Nosakhare (2015), Dienes and Velte (2016) 
concluded that a higher number of board meetings 
would not necessarily translate to better 
sustainability reporting.  
In Nigeria, the revised corporate governance code 
2011 made a pronouncement on the significance of 
board meetings in enhancing the effectiveness of 
board functions. Accordingly, the code stipulates 
that corporate board should meet regularly. The 
board should disclose the number of board 
meetings held within the year and the detail 
attendance of each director in respect of meetings 
held. The code specifically requires companies to 
hold at least four board meetings in a year, once 
every quarter. Building on this argument, this s tudy 
expects a positive association between board 
meetings and sustainability disclosure. 
Accordingly, it is hypothesize that increased in 
frequency of board meetings would lead to higher 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual 
reports of companies.  
H4: Board meeting has a significant positive 
influence on the level of sustainability disclosure     
2.1.2.5 Moderating Influence of Intellectual 
Capital on Board Size and Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Corporate board is considered among the primary 
internal governance mechanism (Brennan, 2006). 
The board is recognized as a major decision-
making group that acts on behalf of shareholders. A 
well-constituted board with optimum number of 
directors is likely to be effective in monitoring the 
activities of corporate management and in driving 
value enhancement for shareholders (Kumar & 
Singh, 2013). Different opinions are bound on what 
constitutes an optimal size of corporate boards. 
However, most studies argue in favor of larger 
boards maintaining that, increased in the size of 
corporate board lead to intensity in board 
monitoring and efficiency. This happened because, 
a large number of directors provide the diversity 
and experience required to control corporate 
activities often proposed by the board (Sánchez, 
Domínguez, & Álvarez, 2011). Larger boards 
exercise better monitoring which enhances the 
exchange of innovative ideas and experiences (Esa 
& Mohd-Ghazali, 2012; Giannarakis, 2014).  
In a different perspective, larger board size offers 
diverse knowledge and expertise which 
substantially affect the level of sustainability 
disclosure in companies. Such constituted boards 
enable companies to bring critical, diverse 
resources and experiences onto the board which 
effectively enhance board decision-making 
processes. Therefore, with a large board size, board 
members can easily assist by linking companies 
with the external environment and securing critical 
resources (Martinez-ferrero, Rodriguez-Ariza, & 
Garcia-Sanchez, 2017). In such a case, intellectual 
capital being a critical resource can be deployed to 
achieve this objective. Larger boards are the most 
likely to increase companies’ ability to secure 
critical resources from their environment including 
intellectual capital (Abeysekera, 2010). Therefore, 
with efficient application of intellectual capital 
processes and capabilities, board size can add to the 
diversity of perspectives by way of providing 
greater choices among solutions and decision 
criteria (Abeysekera, 2010). This will likely help in 
achieving corporate sustainability goals and 
objectives, including enhancing company’s 
legitimacy and its corporate image within the 
society. Based on this reasoning, intellectual capital 
is likely to enhance the relationship between board 
size and sustainability disclosure. Thus, the present 
study hypothesized that: 
H5: Intellectual capital positively moderates the 
relationship between board size and sustainability 
disclosure. 
2.1.2.5. Moderating Influence of Intellectual 
Capital on Board Independence and 
Sustainability Disclosure 
Board independence is a characteristic of the board 
that perfectly represent the interest of stakeholders 
(Garcia-Sanchez, Cuadrado-Ballesteros, & 
Sepulveda, 2014). Independent directors are 
professionals outside the firm, whose prestige is 
strongly align with their actions on the board. Their 
main responsibility is to demonstrate the fulfillment 
of rules and responsible behaviors in companies 
(Haniffa & Cooke, 2005). They guarantee 
necessary checks and balances to improve board 
effectiveness in controlling companies’ activities 
(Michelon & Parbonetti, 2012). Aside, independent 
directors increase the focus on sustainability issues 
and information disclosure (Barako & Brown, 
2008).  They ensure that companies pursue interests 
of diverse stakeholders other than just shareholders. 
Independent directors exhibit greater concern for 
sustainability issues by being more sensitive to 
stakeholders’ demands, thereby ensuring the 
legitimacy of their actions and resources (Martinez-
Ferrero et al., 2017).  
However, prior studies provided evidence that 
board independence influences the disclosure of 
companies’ sustainability information. However, 
the impact of board independence on sustainability 
reporting can be improve with efficient utilization 
of intellectual capital strategies and processes. 
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Intellectual capital strategies such as human 
relations, feedbacks, technologies, R&D can be 
deployed by independent directors to support 
socially related disclosure (Al-Musali & Ismail, 
2015). Accordingly, investment in intangible assets 
such as knowledge and skills is more likely to offer 
creative solutions that will enhance the disclosure 
of sustainability disclosure information. Therefore, 
a prudent investment in intellectual capital 
processes will likely increase the efficiency of 
sustainability reporting practices. Based on the 
points above, the present study anticipates that the 
relationship between board independence and 
sustainability disclosure will be improve with the 
application of intellectual capital. Accordingly, it is 
hypothesize that: 
H6: Intellectual capital positively moderates the 
relationship between board Independence and 
sustainability disclosure. 
2.1.2.6 Moderating Influence of Intellectual 
Capital on Board Diversity and Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Board gender diversity is considered as one of the 
most significant human capital attributes that relate 
to companies’ performance (Carter, D’Souza, 
Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Toumi, Benkraiem, & 
Hamrouni, 2016). Female directors play prominent 
roles in board monitoring and effectiveness. They 
are outstanding in board processes due to their 
active participation as members of different 
committees (Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Female 
board members improve decision-making processes 
in boardrooms (Bilmoria, 2000). They have better 
ability to pay more attention and therefore have a 
greater sense of corporate sustainability initiatives 
(Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Therefore, the presence of 
females in corporate board is associated with a 
stronger orientation towards companies’ 
sustainability disclosure (Ibrahim & Angelidis, 
2011). It is linked to the broader perspective of 
supporting corporate board to serve the needs of 
various stakeholders. 
Besides, board diversity promotes greater 
innovation and flexibility in the decision-making 
process of companies. They help in stimulating the 
creation of high-quality, innovative solutions 
through interactions. In the process of such 
interactions, a diverse board member will be able to 
identify, synthesize and discern various views 
(Berezinets, Garanina, & Ilina, 2016). Also, board 
diversity enhances corporate boards’ ability to 
instigate more comprehensive strategies, policies, 
activities, and projects that create attractive 
working conditions for a broader spectrum of 
potential employees (Al-Musali & Ismail, 2015). In 
this way, they improve companies’ understanding 
of perceptions and the needs of customers and 
employees. Promote the willingness to change, 
adapt and strengthen companies’ relationship with 
both internal and external stakeholder groups (Al-
Musali & Ismail, 2015; Swartz & Firer, 2005). All 
of these strategies are intellectual capital 
approaches that are often adopted by a diverse 
board to achieve a successful sustainability 
disclosure practices in companies. Accordingly, 
intellectual capital is likely to serve as a moderating 
variable on the relationship between board diversity 
and sustainability disclosure. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that: 
H7: Intellectual capital positively moderates the 
relationship between board diversity and 
sustainability disclosure. 
2.1.2.7 Moderating Influence of Intellectual 
Capital on Board Meetings and Sustainability 
Disclosure 
Board meeting frequency is an important corporate 
governance mechanism that ensures board related 
issues are well discuss and board members are 
given the opportunities to confer and to set 
strategies (Vafeas, 1999). The board meeting is a 
key dimension of board operations and also an 
indicator of effort put in place by corporate 
directors. It is considered as a resource that 
determines board diligence which in turn enhance 
board effectiveness. The frequency of board 
meetings is a factor that is likely to contribute to 
the effectiveness of boards’ oversight function, 
specifically, in matters that relates to the financial 
reporting process and transparency in corporate 
reporting (Al-Ebel, 2014). Therefore, an active 
board that meets more frequently is more likely to 
perform its duties to satisfy the interest of 
shareholders. Such board is likely to have a better 
capacity to put more effort in monitoring the 
integrity of corporate reporting, thereby improving 
its disclosure (Vafeas, 1999).  
Besides, board meeting is also an important factor 
that determines the disclosure of sustainability 
information in annual reports of companies. It 
serves as a symbolic representation of a better 
corporate sustainability disclosure. The frequency 
of board meetings provides more capacity and 
opportunities to corporate board in divulging more 
information that will be realize by stakeholders 
about the efficiency of the board (Jackling & Johl, 
2009; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Board holds 
frequent meetings to handle business operations 
and disclose companies’ sustainability information 
to effectively satisfy diverse stakeholders (Naseem, 
Riaz, Rehman, Ikram, & Malik, 2017). Therefore, 
companies with higher frequency in board meetings 
are more effective in coordinating and facilitating 
adequate response to negative impacts on the 
environment. Accordingly, frequency of board 
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meetings serve as a device for diminishing 
problems of information asymmetries between 
managers and diverse stakeholders (Kanagaretnam, 
Lobo, & Whalen, 2007; Shan, 2013).  
However, prior empirical research on the 
relationship between the frequency of board 
meetings and companies’ sustainability disclosure 
evidenced inconclusive findings. These imply that 
there is evidence in support of the positive impact 
of board meetings on sustainability disclosure. Still, 
there are also suggestions to the contrary. 
Accordingly, the present study suggests testing the 
relationship indirectly using intellectual capital as a 
contextual variable. Intellectual capital is one of the 
companies’ intangible resource that varies 
companies’ uniqueness and capabilities. Frequent 
board meetings can improve the innovative 
performance of companies since it increases the 
likelihood of consensus among directors and helps 
in handling uncertainties (Wincent, Anokhin, & 
Örtqvist, 2010). Therefore, with frequent meetings, 
corporate board is more likely to provide effective 
management control of intellectual capital which is 
likely to aid more disclosure of sustainability 
information (Marques, Jose, Simon, & Caranana, 
2006). Besides, frequency of board meetings also 
helps corporate board members to evaluate research 
and development projects thoroughly. It enables the 
board to monitor and supervise progress and to take 
necessary action for the project with a slow pace of 
progress (Rabi, Zulkafli, & Haat, 2010). The 
preceding strategies mentioned above ultimately 
help in improving intellectual capital and in turn 
enhance the disclosure of sustainability 
information. Accordingly, this study hypothesizes 
that intellectual capital will moderate the 
relationship between board meetings and 
sustainability disclosure. Hence, the following 
hypothesis is postulated for the guiding of the 
study. 
H8: Intellectual capital positively moderates the 
relationship between board meetings and 
sustainability disclosure. 
3.1 Research Method 
3.1.1 Data Collection 
The companies selected for analysis were those 
listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The 
data for this study was derived from companies’ 
annual reports and stand-alone sustainability 
reports. The study’s population is the entire 
companies listed on the main market of the NSE. 
As of 30 June 2015, there were 188 active listed 
entities from 11 different sectors. The number of 
companies from various sectors are as summarized 
in Table I. However, to determine the appropriate 
sample size, filtering criteria previously used by 
Hung and Subramanyam (2007) was adopted for 
the study. The criteria include, a company must be 
listed and remain active in the market within the 
study period, and a company must have either 
corporate annual reports or stand-alone 
sustainability report for all years selected for the 
study. Out of the 188 companies, 80 companies 
scaled the filtering test and made up the sample. 
The remaining 108 companies were either not 
listed or de-listed within the study period or do not 
have complete annual reports for all the years 
(2010-2015). The computation of the sample size is 
as depicted in Table II. 





Agriculture  5 2.66 25 
Conglomerate 6 3.19 30 
Construction/real estate 9 4.79 45 
Consumer goods 28 14,89 140 
Financial services 57 30.32 285 
Healthcare 11 5.85 55 
ICT 9 4.79 45 
Industrial goods 21 11.17 105 
Natural resources 5 2.66 25 
Oil and gas  14 7.45 70 
Services    23 12.23 115 
Total  188 100 940 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange Website 
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3.1.2 Variables Measurement 
A content analysis was used to extract information 
on companies’ sustainability disclosure using an 
un-weighted disclosure index. Based on the un-
weighted disclosure index, “1” indicates the 
presence of sustainability information and “0” 
otherwise (Chau & Gray, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2005; Mohd Ghazali, 2007; Monteiro & Aibar-
Guzmán, 2010). The nature and trend of 
sustainability disclosure were assessed using a 
sentence-counting method similar to Michelon and 
Parbonetti (2010). GRI G4 standard was used as 
the checklist. Based on the checklist, social 
disclosure has a total of 48 points while the 
environmental disclosure has a maximum of 34 
points. Therefore, each annual report has the 
chances of scoring a minimum of 0 and a 
maximum of 82 points for both social and 
environmental disclosures. The same content 
analysis approach was also used to extract 
information on intellectual capital disclosure in 
annual reports of sampled companies. This study 
adopts an intellectual capital disclosure checklist 
previously used by Haji and Mubaraq (2012). The 
items in the checklist were categorized into three, 
internal capital, external capital and human capital. 
The total number of items in the checklist is 44 of 
which, ten items belong to internal capital 
disclosure, 16 items represent external capital 
disclosure and the remaining 18 items are human 
capital disclosure, refer appendix II for details. 
Data related to corporate governance attributes 
(board size, board independence, board diversity 
and board meetings) and control variables (firm 
performance, firm size, industry type, liquidity, 
leverage) were hand collected from the sampled 
companies’ annual reports.  
3.1.3 Models and Techniques for Analysis 
This study adopted a panel data approach in 
analyzing the data collected from companies’ 
annual reports. Both descriptive and inferential 
analysis were performed using Stata 13 analytical 
software. A descriptive statistics was performed 
basically to summarize the data into a manageable 
form with the view to make it more concise and to 
provide a summary of the sample and 
measurements. A multiple regression was applied 
to test the hypothesis based on the research models 
specified below. The present study controlled for 
other determinants of sustainability disclosures to 
avoid biased results in the empirical regression 
models, this includes firm performance, firm size, 
industry type, liquidity and leverage. Accordingly, 
model I was postulated to test the direct effect of 
board governance mechanism (board size, board 
independence, board diversity and board meetings) 
on the level of sustainability disclosure. The 
coefficients β 1 to β 4 are independent variables in 
the model. They are expected to be positive and 
significantly related to the level of corporate 
sustainability disclosure. Coefficients β5 to β9 are 
the control variables; there are also expected to be 
positive and significantly associated with 
sustainability disclosure. However, model II is 
proposed to test the indirect effect of intellectual 
capital on board governance mechanisms and 
sustainability disclosure. Moderation model tests 
whether the prediction of a dependent variable by 
independent variable differs across the level of a 
third variable. Moderation effect tends to exist 
when the interaction term explains a statistically 
significant amount of variance in the dependent 
variable. In this case, this study will test to 
determine whether inclusion of intellectual capital 
as a moderator variable will lead to a significant 
variation in the effect of independent variables on 
the dependent variable.  
Table II: Frequency and percentage of sample companies by sector 
S/N Industry  
Number of 
Companies 
Percentage  Observations  
1 Agriculture  3 3.75 18 
2 Conglomerate 3 3.75 18 
3 Construction/real estate 2 2.5 12 
4 Consumer goods 11 13.75 66 
5 Financial services 36 45 216 
6 Healthcare Services 3 3.75 18 
7 ICT 2 2.5 12 
8 Industrial goods 6 7.5 36 
9 Natural resources 1 1.25 6 
10 Oil and gas  6 7.5 36 
11 Services    7 8.75 42 
- Total  80 100 480 
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β0 =         Intercept estimates 
SRD =     Sustainability Disclosure (Aggregate score of social and environmental disclosure)  
ICD =   Intellectual capital disclosure (Aggregate of internal, external and human capital disclosure) 
BSIZE=   Board Size (Total number of directors on corporate board) 
BIND=     Board Independence (Proportion of independent directors to total number of directors on board) 
BDIV =   Board Diversity (Number of female directors on corporate board)  
BMEET=Board Meetings (Number of meetings held by board of directors in a year) 
FPM =     Financial Performance proxy by ROA (Profit after taxation divided by total assets) 
CSIZE  = Firm Size (Natural logarithm of total assets) 
INDUS = Industry Type (1 for companies in highly sensitive industries and 0 otherwise) 
LIQ =       Liquidity (current assets divided by current liabilities) 
LEV =      Leverage (total debt to total assets) 
       =      Error term. 
 
4.1 Findings and Discussions  
4.1.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Table II contains the description of the sampled 
companies based on their varied sectors. A total of 
80 companies were selected as sample yielding a 
total of 480 firm-year observations. Most of the 
selected companies belong to consumer goods 
(13.75 percent), financial services (45 percent) and 
general services (8.75 percent). 2.5 percent each of 
the sampled companies were from construction/real 
estate and ICT. Agriculture, conglomerate and 
health care services constitute 3.75 percent each. 
7.5 percent each represented oil and gas and 
industrial goods. Natural resources only represent 
1.25 percent of the total sample. Aside, the 
descriptive statistics for the extent of sustainability 
disclosure was discussed in this section. The 
disclosure scores were summarized based on social 
and environmental disclosures and subsequently 
aggregated as sustainability disclosure. The 
disclosure items were summarized based on items 
category, their sub-categories, the respective scores 
for each sub-category and the percentage scores. 
The GRI G4 standard checklist was used for 
scoring items in companies’ annual reports.  
Information on companies’ socially related 
disclosure is contained in Appendix 1A. Based on 
the information extracted from sampled annual 
reports, a total of 499 annual reports representing 
99.8 percent disclosed information on employment, 
training and education as well as community 
involvement. These items were the highest socially 
related items disclosed in companies’ annual 
reports. Disclosure on companies’ non-
discrimination policies was the second most 
disclose item with 498 scores representing 97.5 
percent of the total sampled annual reports. 
Occupational health and safety were the next most 
disclosed item. The third most disclosed item is 
diversity and employees’ equal opportunities. In 
contrast, information on supplier assessment for 
impact on society, information on suppliers’ human 
right assessment, customers’ privacy and marketing 
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communications are the least disclosed socially 
related items. All of the preceding items contained 
no evidence of disclosure in companies’ annual 
reports or stand-alone reports.  
An assessment of the sampled annual reports also 
revealed evidence of companies’ commitment to 
environmental issues in Nigeria. However, most 
companies concentrate more on socially related 
disclosure, thereby neglecting most of the 
environmentally related disclosure. Concerning the 
information sourced from companies’ annual 
reports as delineated in Appendix 1B. 19.1 percent 
of the total sampled annual reports disclose 
information on reduction of energy consumption. 
17.3 percent on material used and recycled. 9 
percent disclose information on reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions and 5. 8 percent on 
volume of water recycled and reused. However, 
few companies provide information on the negative 
environmental impact on the supply chain (0.6 
percent). While 0.2 percent provided information 
on the number of grievances about environmental 
impacts (0.2 percent), 1.7 percent disclose 
information on significant fines and sanctions for 
non-compliance with environmental laws. A close 
look at companies’ annual reports indicates less to 
desire regarding companies’ commitment to safer 
environmental practices and disclosures. The 
overall environmental disclose information 
presented in sampled annual reports are grossly 
inadequate and archaic for effective environmental 
monitoring. Very few companies have the culture 
of presenting adequate information to stakeholders. 
Information that will reasonably be considered 
informative about companies’ commitment to 
environmental safety and necessary actions taken to 
prevent companies’ negative impact on the 
environment.  
Table III present descriptive statistics for the 
dependent, independent, moderating and control 
variables used in the study. The descriptive 
statistics were presented based on how the study’s 
variables were tested in the regression analysis. The 
disclosure score for sustainability disclosure (SRD) 
ranges in between 8 to 53 percent over the years of 
this study (2010-2015). The highest average score 
of 14.48 percent was recorded in 2015. Therefore, 
the average disclosure score despite being the 
highest score over the period of this study is still 
considered low going by the antecedent of 
sustainability disclosure in some developing 
countries (Odera, Scott, & Gow, 2016; Uwuigbe & 
Jimoh, 2012). A possible explanation for the low 
disclosure of sustainability information in the 
sampled annual reports could be due to the 
voluntary nature of the practice in the country. In 
Nigeria, companies are not obligated to report 
sustainability information in their annual report; 
they are only encouraged to do so in line with the 
global best practices. Companies disclose 
sustainability information based on their discretion. 
This scenario may have accounted for the low 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual 
reports of companies. 
 As reflected in Table III, the average BSIZE of 
listed companies in Nigeria was 10 members over 
the six-year period (2010-2015). The minimum 
board size ranges in between 4 to 6 throughout this 
study, while the maximum size board had 20 
directors. Similar numbers were reported by 
Ujunwa (2012) and Boubaker, et al. (2014). 
Accordingly, Boubaker et al. (2014) criticized the 
practice of managing larger boards by Nigerian 
companies which do not correspond with the sizes 
of corporate boards in the US and other western 
countries. Accordingly, Ogbechie and Koufopoulos 
(2010) affirm that a high demand by many 
significant shareholders to have a representative on 
the corporate board is the reason for larger boards 
in Nigeria. This practice is considered defective as 
larger boards are widely known to be less effective 
and could lead to a free rider problem, a state 
where board members play a passive role on board. 
The proportion of BIND is low among Nigeria’s 
corporate boards. The average proportion of 
independent directors on Nigeria corporate boards 
is in between 7 to 13 percent over the period of this 
research. The minimum percent is 0 and a 
maximum of 55.56 percent. However, despite the 
low proportion of independent directors on 
Nigeria’s corporate boards, the numbers evidence 
an increased growth in the proportion of 
independent directors over the years. More 
specifically, the average value for BIND increases 
from 7.60 percent in 2010 to 12.76 percent in the 
year 2015. This increase is credited to the recent 
changes in the country’s corporate governance 
process. Particularly, the provision of the latest 
corporate governance code 2011 stipulates that 
listed companies should have at least one 
independent director on their boards. Similarly, the 
provision in the CBN corporate governance code 
for bank and other financial institution was also 
instrumental in improving the independence of 
corporate boards. This provision requires banks to 
have at least two independent directors on board 
(Ogbechie & Koufopoulos, 2010).  
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Based on the descriptive analysis, the minimum 
and maximum value for BDIV range from 0 to 
42.86 percent. The average proportion of women 
directors is 11.02 percent in 2010, 11.11 percent in 
2011, 12.29 percent in 2012, 13.42 percent in 2013, 
14.22 percent in 2014 and 2015 14.47 percent. 
From this analysis, it is evidence that female 
representation on corporate boards of Nigerian 
listed companies has marginally increased from 
11.02 percent in 2010 to 14.47 percent in the year 
2015. However, despite the increase in the 
proportion of female representation on Nigeria’s 
corporate boards, the number is viewed low 
compared to the rapidly growing number of female 
representation on boards of other developed and 
developing countries (Ujunwa, 2012). For example, 
data released by GMI ratings in the year 2013 
reveal that 36.1 percent of board members in 
Norwegian corporate boards are female, 17 percent 
in Dutch boards, 26.8 and 27 percent in Swedish 
and Finnish boards respectively. Therefore, gender 
representation in Nigerian corporate boards reflects 
the global concerns for low women representation 
in boardrooms.  
Based on this descriptive analysis, corporate 
directors held a minimum of 1 meeting and a 
maximum of 15 meetings throughout the years of 
this study. The average meetings held were 5.15, 
5.29, 4.99, 5.00, 5.30, 5.09 in 2010, 2011, 2012, 
2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. However, the 
average board meeting frequency remained mostly 
unchanged from 2010 to 2015. On average, 5 board 
meetings were held every year by the board of 
directors. The 5 average board meetings observed 
by boards of Nigerian listed companies is an 
indication of compliance with the provision of 
Nigeria’s revised corporate governance code. The 
governance code specified that corporate board 
must hold a minimum of 4 board meetings in a 
year. Going by this analysis, Nigerian corporate 
boards are fully in compliance with the minimum 
requirement for board meetings as prescribed in the 
2011 revised corporate governance code.  
Meanwhile, the descriptive statistics for ICD 
among sampled companies was also delineated in 
Table III. The average disclosure score for the 
entire period under study indicates a sustained 
increased in the level of ICD among sampled 
companies. Specifically, the average disclosure 
score increased every year from 54.49 percent in 
2010 to 57.19 percent in 2015. The increased in the 
level of ICD is anticipated considering the recent 
shift in countries dynamics all over the world. This 
in turn prompts countries to move from the 
erstwhile traditional product based economy to one 
driven by knowledge (Oba, Ibikunle, & Damagum, 
2013). However, the outcome of this analysis 
commiserates with Mubaraq and Haji (2014) which 
acknowledge the increase in intellectual capital 
disclosure in annual reports of listed companies. 
Haji and Mubarak reported an increase in the 
average disclosure from 35.45 percent in 2006 to 
41.02 percent in 2009.  
Firm performance is proxy by ROA. Also from 
Table III, the average ROA for the full sample from 
the highest to the lowest is 5.53 percent in 2011, 
5.18 in 2013, 4.72 in 2010, 4.47 in 2012, 4.44 in 
2014 and 3.07 in 2015. The average score indicates 
a decrease in ROA for companies listed on NSE 
from 5.53 percent in 2011 to 3.07 percent in 2015. 
The descriptive statistics for leverage measured as 
the ratio of total debt divided by total asset was also 
presented in Table III. The mean value score for 
leverage ranges in between 38.98 percent to 42.14 
percent over the years of the study. However, the 
mean score remains relatively unchanged over the 
years. Firm size proxy by natural logarithm of total 
assets indicates a minimum score of 13.01 and a 
maximum of 23.26 over the six years of this study. 
The average firm size was 17.29 in 2010, 17.45 in 
2011, 17.55 in 2012, 17.67 in 2013, 17.72 in 2014 
and 17.76 in 2015. Moreover, current ratio a proxy 
for companies’ liquidity indicates a yearly average 
value of 0.0183, 0.0190, 0.0136, 0.0138, 0.0141 
and 0.0139 for 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 
2015 respectively. The current ratios for the 
sampled companies were below the acceptable 
minimum standard of 2:1. This is indeed a 
disturbing phenomenon. Industry type is measured 
using a dummy, “1” is assigned to companies in the 
sensitive industries and “0” otherwise. As also 
reflected in Table III, the descriptive statistics 
shows a minimum value of 0 and a maximum of 
1and a mean score of 2. 
4.1.2 Multiple Regression Analysis  
4.1.2.1 Direct Effect of Board Governance 
Mechanism on Sustainability Disclosure  
This section presents a discussion on the 
relationship between board characteristics variables 
and sustainability disclosure. The regression result 
is delineated in Table IV. As depicted in the Table, 
the regression model exhibits a satisfactory 
explanatory power with an F-statistic value of 
13.60 (p = 0.000) and a moderate R
2
 value of 28.68 
percent. This implies that the independent variables 
explained 28.68 percent of the variance in the level 
of sustainability disclosure. Additionally, the 
collinearity diagnosis performed to ensure that the 
data met the underlying assumption of OLS 
regressions indicate no severe multicollinearity 
problem in the regression model. As depicted in 
Table IV, the VIF values of all the independent 
variables were lower than 2. These values were far 
below the suggested rule of thumb of 5 
recommended by field (2005).   
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The regression analysis for the association between 
board size and level of sustainability disclosure is 
as presented in Table IV. The regression result 
indicates a significant positive relationship between 
board size and sustainability disclosure. The result 
is reflected by a positive coefficient value 0.1877 (t 
= 3.36 p = 0.001) significant at 1 percent. The 
positive relationship between board size and 
sustainability disclosure implies that companies 
with the larger board size disclosed significantly 
more sustainability information. Therefore, 
increase in the size of corporate board lead to 
higher disclosure of sustainability information in 
the annual report of companies. This finding 
corroborates with the projected hypotheses. Hence, 
H1 is supported. The finding is also consistent with 
the following studies, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) Esa 
and Mohd-Ghazali (2012), Cheng, Oh and Jung 
(2012). These studies concluded that board size is a 
significant factor influencing the extent of 
sustainability disclosure in annual report of 
companies.  
Similarly, Chang et al. (2012) also found a 
significant relationship between board size and 
sustainability. The study concluded that a larger 
board size is more independent and also exercise 
more power over companies top management. 
Also, larger boards have more capability and 
capacity to influence management to increase the 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual 
reports of companies. In the same way, Esa and 
Mohd-Ghazali (2012) believe that larger boards are 
more equip with diverse backgrounds and 
experience. Such boards are more exposed to 
dynamic and healthier discussion about corporate 
sustainability practices and investment in the 
practice. Similarly, a study conducted on a sample 
of 40 listed companies in Nigeria by Omobola and 
Uwuigbe (2013) reveals that larger boards are more 
diverse regarding knowledge, more effective and 
more likely to have a higher degree of 
independence. Such boards usually strike a balance 
between organizational actions and decisions and 
also between societal values and corporate 
legitimacy. Based on the preceding, board size is 
found to be a significant variable that influences the 
disclosure of corporate sustainability information in 
annual reports of Nigerian listed companies. 
The regression output for board independence and 
sustainability disclosure was significant at 5 
percent with a coefficient positive value 0.0979 (t = 
2.14 p = 0.033). The positive association suggests 
that companies with more independent directors 
disclosed more sustainability information in their 
annual reports. The finding shows that H2 is 
supported, the findings corroborate with the 
projected hypotheses. This result is also consistent 
with prior findings (Huang, 2010; Jo & Harjoto, 
2012; Khan, 2010;  Kaur et al., 2016; Sharif & 
Rashid, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013). However, the 
likely reason for the significant association between 
board independence and sustainability disclosure is 
that independent directors are viewed as a check 
and balance mechanism, which ensures that 
companies act in the best interest of not just 
owners, but to other stakeholders as well through 
disclosure of sustainability information (Khan, 
2010). In this way, independent board members 
work towards ensuring a balance between the 
interest of shareholders, stakeholders and the 
generality of society. Therefore, a higher 
proportion of independent directors on corporate 
boards will lead to effective monitoring of boards, 
resulting in more disclosure of sustainability 
information in companies’ annual report. Based on 
the evidence presented above, the present study 
validates the proposition that independent directors 
bring objectivity and external awareness to 
corporate boards. Therefore, the presence of more 
independent directors on corporate board leads to 
increase in sustainability disclosure and also bring 
transparency in companies’ functioning. 
 
 
Table IV: Relationship between Board Characteristics and Sustainability Disclosure  
Variables Exp Sign Coef. T-Value P-Value VIF 
CONS ? 0.0000 0.00 1.000 - 
BSIZEit + 0.1877 3.36 0.001 1.85 
BINDit + 0.0979 2.14 0.033 1.75 
BDIVit + 0.1294 3.69 0.000 1.27 
BMEET it + -0.0726 -1.64 0.102 1.22 
FPM it + 0.1560 3.57 0.000 1.19 
LEVit + 0.1500 3.14 0.002 1.15 
CSIZEit + 0.3007 5.64 0.000 1.14 
LIQit + -0.0332 -0.98 0.325 1.09 
INDUSit + 0.2226 4.53 0.000 1.08 
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In reference to Table IV, the regression result for 
board diversity-sustainability relationship present a 
positive coefficient value 0.1294 (t = 3.69 p = 
0.000) significant at 1 percent. This result suggests 
that a higher number of women directors in 
corporate boards lead to higher disclosure of 
sustainability information in annual report of 
companies. The result of this study corroborate 
with the proposed hypotheses formulated earlier in 
the study. Thus, H3 is supported. Accordingly, the 
result indicates that female board members play a 
pivotal role in the disclosure of companies’ 
sustainability information. The finding coincides 
with Setó-Pamies (2013), Bear et al. (2010), 
Sundarasen and Rajangam (2016), Rao and Tilt 
(2016). These studies unanimously conclude that 
participation of females in the management of 
companies’ board positive impact the level of 
corporate sustainability information disclosure. 
Specifically, the study supports the assertions of 
Bear et al. (2010) which claim that female directors 
bring to the boards a variety of strengths, including 
sensitivity to companies’ social and environmental 
disclosures. Female directors are more thoughtful 
to the needs of others, there are also more active 
and concern with issues of strategic nature, 
especially, issues that directly relate to companies’ 
stakeholders (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). The result is 
also in line with the thought of Sundarasen and 
Rajangam (2016) which suggest consideration of 
board diversity in the future selection of board 
members. By so doing, the appointment of more 
women into companies’ boards will serve as 
efficient diversity strategy that is likely to improve 
companies’ performance particularly, social and 
environmental performance.  
The analysis on Table IV shows that H4 is not 
supported. The regression output reveals that board 
meeting was insignificantly related to sustainability 
disclosure. The insignificant positive coefficient 
value suggests that board meetings have less 
influence on the level of sustainability information 
disclosed by companies. Accordingly, the 
frequency of board meetings will not necessarily 
lead to higher disclosure of sustainability 
information in annual reports of Nigerian 
companies. A possible explanation for the 
insignificant relationship observed in this study 
may be due to the problem of taking over 
monitoring role of corporate boards by other 
factors. For example, external ownership may take 
the place of board monitoring actions. In such case, 
corporate boards may only be responsible for social 
and environmental issues at the policy level instead 
of at the point of implementation level. Therefore, 
no matter how frequent the board meetings are, 
sustainability reporting policies and practices will 
not be affected. Hence, board meetings will have an 
insignificant effect on companies’ sustainability 
disclosure.  
However, Dienes and Velte (2016) shared a similar 
view as the study refute the assumption that 
increased in board meeting frequency invariably 
raised the quantity of sustainability disclosure. 
Similarly, a study conducted by Rodríguez-Ariza et 
al. (2011) on 568 companies from 15 different 
countries claims that frequency of board meetings 
is certainly not an appropriate indicator of board 
efficiency. As such, higher board meetings will not 
lead to increase disclosure of corporate 
information. In the same vein, Giannarakis (2014) 
established that board meeting is not a substantial 
governance factor that influences the extent of 
sustainability information disclosure. Alhazaimeh, 
Palaniappan and Almsafir (2014) on their part 
attributed the insignificant findings to the 
inefficacy of board meetings which is considered 
far below its efficient point in most developing 
countries.  
4.1.2.2 Indirect Effect of Board Governance 
Mechanism on Sustainability Disclosure 
This section discusses the indirect effect of board 
governance mechanism on sustainability disclosure 
after incorporation of intellectual capital as the 
interactive variable. Accordingly, the multiple 
regression analysis results are reflected in Table V. 
As depicted in the Table; the F-value is 13.23 (P = 
0.000) suggesting that the result statistically 
supports the significance of the model. Similarly, 
the model explanatory power is relatively high with 
an R
2 
measure of 39.18 percent, implying that 
independent variables explain 39.18 percent of the 
variance in the dependent variable. As depicted in 
Table V, the inclusion of moderating variable 
(intellectual capital) in the relationship between 





 Observations 480 
   R2 28.68% 
   MeanVIF         1.3 
 
Notes: CONSit = constant, BSIZEit = board size, BINDit = board independence, BDIVit = board diversity, BMEETit = 
board meetings, FPM it = financial performance, LEVit = leverage, CSIZEit = firm size, LIQit = liquidity, INDUSit = 
industry type, i and t refer to ﬁrm and year. *, **, *** denotes significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
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statistically significant coefficient value 1.0024 (t = 
2.03 p = 0.043). This result indicates that there is a 
significant effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable when the interaction term is 
entered into the regression model. Accordingly, 
intellectual capital is confirmed to have a 
moderating influence on board size-sustainability 
disclosure relationship. Hence, H5 is supported. 
Based on this result, intellectual capital strategies 
and processes are vital resources that could be 
deployed by large boards to achieve effective 
sustainability disclosure. 
Also, the interactive effect of intellectual capital on 
board independence and sustainability disclosure 
produce a positive and statistically significant 
result. The coefficient value was positive and 
significant at 10 percent 0.8471(t = 1.90 p = 0.058). 
This result suggests that intellectual capital has a 
moderating impact on board independence and 
sustainability relationship. The finding suggests 
that the proposed hypothesis is supported. As such, 
H5 is confirmed. Accordingly, the findings from 
this study suggest that independent directors are in 
a better position to evaluate and ratify companies’ 
long-term strategies to achieve an enhanced 
sustainability disclosure in companies. 
Accordingly, independent directors can harness 
companies’ intellectual resources to improve the 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual 
reports of companies.  
Moreover, the interaction effect of intellectual 
capital on board diversity and sustainability 
disclosure produced a significant result. The 
coefficient value delineated in Table V indicates a 
significant positive value 1.2763 (t = 2.86 p = 
0.004). The result of this  study specifies that 
intellectual capital strongly moderates the 
relationship between board diversity and 
sustainability disclosure. The finding of this study 
supports the hypothesized relationship presented in 
the previous sections. Hence, H6 is supported. 
Similarly, the result of the study supports the view 
of Al-Musali and Ismail (2015) which claims that 
intellectual capital related policies and strategies 
are effective tools for improving the effectiveness 
of a diverse board especially in the capacity of 
providing better advice and counseling on strategic 




As also presented in Table V, the finding of this 
study shows that intellectual capital does not 
moderate the relationship between board meetings 
and sustainability disclosure. The coefficient value 
was negative and insignificant -0.4701 (t = -1.07 p 
= 0.287) suggesting an insignificant interaction 
effect in the model. This implies that intellectual 
capital does not moderate the relationship between 
board meetings and sustainability disclosure. 
Accordingly, the result of this study has failed to 
support the hypotheses previously conjectured in 
this study. Thus, H6 is not supported. The result 
from this study contradicts the popular view of 
Wincent et al. (2010) which proclaims that board 
meetings improve the innovative performance of 
companies and also helpful in handling 
uncertainties which in turn improve the 
sustainability programmes and initiatives of 
companies.  
4.1.2.3 Effect of Control Variables in the Models  
This section discusses the control variables 
employed for this study. The variables includes 
firm performance, leverage, firm size, industry type 
and liquidity. As depicted on Table IV and Table 
V, the relationship between firm performance and 
sustainability disclosure indicates a significant 
positive coefficient value in both direct and indirect 
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effect models. The significant positive coefficient 
indicates that financial performance is sensitive to 
sustainability disclosure. This implies that 
companies with higher financial performance 
disclosed more sustainability information than 
companies with lower financial performance. This 
finding corroborates with Joshi and Gao (2009), 
Stuebs and Sun (2015) which empirical proof 
financial performance to be an important factor in 
the disclosure of sustainability information in 
annual reports of companies. Similarly, leverage 
was found to have a significant positive influence 
on sustainability disclosure. The coefficient value 
was positive and significant at 1 percent in model 1 
(t = 3.14 p = 0.002) and model 2 (t = 3.99 p = 
0.000). This suggests that companies with higher 
leverage value are more likely to disclose higher 
sustainability information. Previous studies with 
similar findings include Esa and Mohd-Ghazali 
(2012), Juhmani (2014), Saleh, Zulkifli and 
Muhamad (2012). Therefore, companies with 
highly leveraged capital structure are likely to 
disclose higher sustainability information to portray 
to the outside world their commitment to the 
interest of all stakeholders. This step will likely 
lessen the fears of debt-holders about managers’ 
opportunistic activities. 
The analysis on Table IV shows that firm size has a 
significant influence on the level of sustainability 
information disclose in annual reports of 
companies. The coefficient value was positive and 
significant at 1 percent in the direct effect model (t 
= 5.64 p = 0.000). Similar results were reported for 
the indirect effect model as delineated in table V. 
The coefficient value was also positive and 
significant at 5 percent (t = 2.38 p = 0.018). This 
suggests that bigger companies disclose more 
sustainability information than smaller ones. The 
result of this study corresponds with the findings in 
bulk of sustainability disclosure literature. Studies 
such as Ferguson, Lam, and Lee (2002), Abd 
Rahman, Zain and Al-Haj (2011), Barakat, Perez, 
and Ariza (2014) concluded that the larger the size 
of companies, the more likely such companies 
would deploy resources for sustainability 
disclosure initiatives. In the same manner, the 
influence of industry type on sustainability 
disclosure was positive and significant at 1 percent 
in both models. This implies that industry 
membership plays a prominent role in the 
disclosure of sustainability information in annual 
reports of companies. This result is consistent with 
Camfferman and Cooke (2002), Kansal, Joshi, and 
Batra (2014) and Albitar (2015). These studies 
collectively agreed that industry type is a 
significant determinant of companies’ sustainability 
disclosure. Therefore, companies’ chances of 
disclosing sustainability information largely depend 
on their industrial affiliations.   
Finally, the coefficient value of liquidity was 
negative and statistically insignificant in the direct 
effect model -0.0332 (t = -0.98 p = 0.325), but 
negative and statistically significant in the indirect 
model -0.0565 (t = -1.66 p = 0.098). However, both 
results contradict the projected hypotheses in this 
study. The finding goes contrary to the popular 
views in sustainability disclosure literature that 
attributes higher corporate liquidity with increased 
sustainability disclosure. The negative coefficient 
values evidenced in this study suggest that liquidity 
is either having an inverse or non-sensitive 
response to the disclosure of sustainability 
information in annual reports of companies. 
Therefore, companies with high liquidity level will 
not necessarily disclose higher sustainability 
information. This finding is consistent with Lan et 
al. (2013), Al-Ajmi, Al-Mutairi and Al-Duwaila 
(2015) which found liquidity to be insignificant 
related to sustainability disclosure.  
5.1 Conclusion and Recommendations  
The goal of this study was to examine the extent 
and determinants of sustainability disclosure in 
Nigeria. Overall, the practice of sustainability 
reporting in Nigerian business environment is still 
in its embryonic stage. This extent of sustainability 
information disclosure was relatively low 
compared to other developed and developing 
countries. Besides, Nigerian listed companies 
disclose more of socially related information as 
compared to environmental disclosures. Other 
findings from this study suggest that board size, 
board independence and board diversity were 
significant determinants of sustainability 
disclosure. In contrast, board meetings do not seem 
to be a significant factor that determines the level 
of sustainability disclosure. Also, the moderating 
effect of intellectual capital on the relationship 
between board size, board independence, board 
diversity and sustainability disclosure indicates a 
significant positive value. However, intellectual 
capital does not seem to moderate the relationship 
between board meetings and sustainability 
disclosure. Therefore, despite the effective in 
intellectual capital policies and strategies, it will 
not be able to strengthen the relationship between 
board meetings and sustainability disclosure. 
Overall, the findings from this study provide a new 
and fresh perspective on the relationship between 
board governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure in Nigeria.  
Accordingly, the findings have both theoretical and 
practical implications. This study contributed 
theoretically by expanding the scope of prior 
literature on corporate governance mechanisms and 
sustainability disclosure. The study extends the 
relationship through the introduction of intellectual 
capital as an intervening variable. To the best of the 
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researchers’ knowledge, this is the first study that 
tested these relationships empirically. The findings 
suggest that intellectual capital is a variable that 
strengthens the relationship between board 
governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure. Accordingly, this study had extended 
the direction of the relationship between board 
governance mechanisms and sustainability 
disclosure beyond what was documented in the 
prior literature. The study also extended the 
perspective of both stakeholder theory and RBV 
theory by considering the two theories as 
underpinning assumptions in the study. 
Particularly, the study extends the horizon of RBV 
theory by demonstrating how the theory explains 
the indirect relationship between board governance 
variables and sustainability disclosure through a 
third variable intellectual capital.  
From a practical viewpoint, the findings of this 
study have implications for management of listed 
companies in Nigeria. Corporate management 
needs to have a re-think and re-strategies their 
sustainability reporting policies to improve 
sustainability reporting practice in Nigeria. 
Particularly, the result of this study indicates that 
board governance mechanisms have a strong and 
great influence on the extent of sustainability 
disclosure. This therefore provides an avenue for 
companies to identify corporate governance 
attributes that are vital in enhancing their 
sustainability reporting practices. In this manner, 
companies can channel their attention on areas 
where sustainability reporting exposures can 
provide a more strategic advantage in creating 
cordial relationships with diverse stakeholders. 
Similarly, the findings from this study put forth the 
need to incorporate greater transparency in internal 
governance structures of Nigerian companies. This 
can be achieve by way of reinforcing changes in 
companies’ laws relating to corporate governance 
practices and putting in place effective compliance 
mechanisms such as monitoring, benchmarking, 
regular audit. This in turn, enhance the disclosure 
of companies’ sustainability information.  
Also, the result of this study underscores the need 
for a proactive attention towards sustainability 
reporting. Management of Nigerian listed 
companies are advised to take the issue of 
sustainability more seriously to meet the 
expectation of their numerous stakeholders. 
Companies should imbibe the culture of being 
more socially responsible to the environment in 
which they operate since socially responsible 
companies have a more enhanced brand image and 
more reputable in the eyes of consumers. To 
regulatory authorities, this study recommends that 
Nigerian government through its regulatory 
agencies to collaborate with the private sector with 
the view to establish a sustainability reporting 
framework and database. This step will go a long 
way in guiding social and environmental reporting 
in the country. Similarly, government regulation, 
enforcement and also environmental impact 
assessment should also be accorded more serious 
attention by relevant government agencies to 
strengthen sustainability reporting practice in the 
country.   
Nevertheless, the results of this study should be 
interpreted in the light of the following limitations. 
First, the researchers used an unweighted 
disclosure index in scoring the items of 
sustainability in annual reports of companies. This 
method differs from the weighted disclosure index 
which assigns weight to each item of sustainability 
based on prominence. Therefore, future research 
may wish to adopt the weighted approach or both 
approaches to increase the reliability of the result. 
Secondly, this study utilized a quantitative research 
approach which involves extraction of information 
from annual reports or stand-alone reports of listed 
companies in the analysis. Future research can 
undertake a mixed-method study which will 
involve both quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches. A survey method using either 
questionnaires or interviews can be deployed to 
complement the quantitative approach. This may 
likely help in enriching the interpretation of 
quantitative research and possibly assist in 
unraveling other qualitative factors that may 
influence the disclosure of sustainability 
information in companies’ annual reports.      
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 APPENDIX 1A 
Table 5.6 
  
Overview of Social Disclosure in Sampled Annual Reports 
ID Main Categories 
Sub-Categories 
1 2 3 4 




1 Employment 479 (99.8) 70 (14.5) 4 (0.83) - 
2 Labor/Mgt Relations 398 (82.9) - - - 
3 Occupational  Health and Safety 71(14.8) 45 (9.4) 9 (1.9) 467 (97.3) 
4 Training and Education 20 (4.2) 479 (99.8) 29 (6.0) - 
5 Diversity & Equal Opportunity 460 (95.8) - - - 
6 Equal Remuneration for Women and Men 48 (10.0) - - - 
7 Supplier Assessment for Labor Practices  13 (2.7) - - - 
8 Labor Practices Grievances Mechanisms  6 (1.3) - - - 
9 Investment 6 (1.3) 11 (2.3) - - 
10 Non-Discrimination 468 (97.5) - - - 
11 
Freedom of Association & Collective 
Bargaining 
39 (8.1) - - - 
12 Child Labor 16 (3.3) - - - 
13 Forced or Compulsory Labor 10 (2.1) - - - 
14 Security Practices 34 (7.1) - - - 
15 Indigenous Rights  13 (2.7) - - - 
16 Assessment 7 (1.5) - - - 
17 Supplier Human Rights Assessment 0 (0.0) 2 (0.4) - - 
18 Human Rights Grievances Mechanisms  15 (3.1) - - - 
19 Local Communities 479 (99.8) 6 (1.3) - - 
20 Anti-corruption 12 (2.5) 226 (47.1) 25 (5.2) - 
21 Public Policy 414 (86.3) - - - 
23 Compliance 14 (2.9) - - - 
24 
Supplier Assessment for Impacts on 
Society 
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) - - 
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Grievance Mechanisms for Impacts on 
Society 
11 (2.3) - - - 
26 Customers Health and Safety 67 (14.0) 0 (0.0) - - 
27 Product & Service Labelling 19 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.6) - 
28 Marketing Communications  2 (0.42) 2 (0.42) - - 
29 Customers Privacy 1 (0.2) - - - 
30 Compliance 7 (1.5) - -  -  
Notes: 1, 2, 3 and 4 are number of items in each sub-category of social disclosure score based on the GRI G4 




   
Overview of Environmental Disclosure in Sampled Annual Reports 
ID Main Categories 
Sub-Categories     
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Materials 83(17.3) 33 (6.9) - - - - - 
2 Energy 45 (9.4) 14 (2.9) 17(3.5) 
92 
(19.1) 
14(2.9) - - 
3 Water 19 (4.0) 16 (3.3) 28(5.8) - - - - 
4 Biodiversity 3 (0.6) 32 (6.6) 3 (0.6) 6 (1.2) - - - 
5 Emissions 19 (4.0) 7 (1.5) 7 (1.5) 8 (1.6) 43(9.0) 7(1.5) 15(3.1) 




26 (5.4) 12 (2.5) - - - - - 
8 Compliance 8 (1.7) - - - - - - 
9 Transportation 19 (4.0) - - - - - - 










1 (0.2) - - - - - - 
Notes: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are number of items in each sub-category of environmental disclosure based on the 
GRI G4 checklist, refer to Appendix A for the detail description of each sub-category. 
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Intellectual capital Disclosure Checklist 
S/N Internal Capital External Capital Human Capital 
1 Patent Business collaboration  Number of staff 
2 Copyright Joint ventures 
Employee education and 
training 
3 Trademarks Favorable contracts  Employees know-how  
4 Corporate culture Brands  Work related knowledge  
5 Corporate philosophy  Brand recognition  Expertise  




Goodwill Academic qualifications 
8 Financial relations  Distribution channels  Age and gender  












Employee succession path 
training (managerial role) 
12 
 
Customer loyalty  Knowledge sharing  
13 
 
Customer retention  Employee retention 
14 
 
Customer satisfaction  Employee engagement 
15 
 
Customer feedback  Motivation 
16 
 






18    Entrepreneur spirit 
  
 
